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Debt, Theft, Permaculture
Justice and Ecological Scale

Gerry Canavan
If, as Fredric Jameson once wrote, it has become easier to imagine
“the thoroughgoing deterioration of the Earth and of nature” than the
end of capitalism, this is in part because we are increasingly aware
that the two phrases describe in fact the same event.1 But the
imagined extinction of alternatives to capitalism associated with
Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” that so concerns Jameson carries
with it a type of ideological shadow: if capitalism is, as K. William Kapp
once put it, “an economy of unpaid costs,” then our increasing
recognition that the bill is finally coming due must be recognized as a
kind of nascent revolutionary consciousness.2 Bruno Latour, who in his
most well-known book famously declared, “We have never been
modern,” recently wrote that “It has now almost become common
sense that we were able to think we were modern only as long as the
various ecological crises could be denied or delayed.”3
Though Latour and I part ways on many questions about
ecology, on this he is surely correct: we cannot believe anymore that
we are modern, that is, we cannot believe anymore that we have
made some final break with the material realities of soil, air, and water
that sustain us and on which everything depends. This essay seeks to
make a preliminary accounting of the circuits of dependence that
characterize capitalism’s relationship with the environment through the
assertion of an ecological debt that has long been in arrears, though
the bearers of this mortgage may be distant in both space and time.
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The Second Contradiction of Capitalism
When approaching ecology as the “second contradiction” of
capitalism, commenters often begin with a passage on soil ecology
from Capital, volume. 1, chapter 15: “All progress in capitalistic
agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the labourer,
but of robbing the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil
for a given time is a progress towards ruining the lasting sources of
that fertility.”4 John Bellamy Foster has traced Marx’s interest in (and
horror at) this “metabolic rift” to its origins in the work of Justus von
Liebig, whose recognition of the breakdown in the cycle of soil
replenishment led to the development of a process to replenish fields
artificially through the use of chemical fertilizers—which led to a
colonial project of importing guano and other materials from places as
far off as Peru and the South Pacific, and which itself ultimately leads
to an unbalancing of the nitrogen cycle and further ecological
degradation of soil, water, and the climate.5 Nature magazine recently
published an article identifying the nitrogen cycle as one of three
ecological boundaries whose crisis thresholds we have already far
overshot; with 35 million annual tons projected as the “safe” annual
limit, we currently convert over 120 million tons of nitrogen per year.6
Scientific management of the soil has, in this way, only made the
problem worse.
In the soil cycle we find a first mode for imagining ecological
debt. Here we have ecological debt at a kind of zero-level: when you
grow food and ship that food far away—when, that is, you strip
necessary minerals from the soil and ship them out of the local
ecosystem—you destroy the long-term sustainability of your own
agricultural practices. In a sense here the “debt” is owed to oneself, or
at least 3 to one’s local area and immediate descendants, and because
of the local temporal and spatial scales involved it is a debt whose
repayment manifests as a relatively urgent concern. The agricultural
capitalist is motivated to embark on some sort of rational management
of the soil if only to protect his own assets, even if his management is
always fitful and incomplete, and in awkward balance with the pursuit
of profit.
The more fraught cases are those in which the consequences of
the ecological debt rebound, not on you, or even on your descendants,
but on other people living in distant spaces and times. This is the
power plant whose emissions blow across a mountain range into some
another nation, or the factory whose toxic dumping floats downstream
into someone else’s water basin, or the civilization that uses up the
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entire fossil fuel reserve of the planet in a single hundred-year spree.
If, in the case of the soil, the agricultural capitalist cuts his own throat,
we are now on more familiar ground, with the capitalist returning to
his usual practice of cutting someone else’s. It was this phenomenon
that K. William Kapp abstracted in 1950 in The Social Costs of Private
Enterprise as a general law of capitalism: “Capitalism must be
regarded as an economy of unpaid costs, ‘unpaid’ in so far as a
substantial portion of the actual costs of production remain
unaccounted for in entrepreneurial outlays; instead they are shifted to,
and ultimately borne by, third persons or by the community as a
whole.”7 We find therefore that both “contradictions” of capital—both
labor and ecology—are in this way predicated on the existence of
structural debts, “unpaid costs,” that in the case of ecology at least are
becoming unavoidably and often painfully visible to us. This suggests
an oppositional strategy of actualizing these unacknowledged debts,
making an accounting of them in the demand that they be recognized
and paid back.
The metaphorical assertion of a debt where none is admitted is
therefore first and foremost a political act of anticapitalist resistance; it
is an assertion that historical relations of domination and exploitation
have ongoing consequences in the present, a demand that reparation
or remuneration is possible and that therefore it is necessary. Our
Common Agenda, a report published by Latin American and Caribbean
intellectuals in the run-up to the 1992 Earth Summit states the point
directly: “The industrial revolution was based in large part on the
exploitation of natural resources in ways which did not reflect their
true costs. . . . The industrialized countries have incurred an ecological
debt with the world.”8
As Joan Martinez-Alier notes in her essay “Environmental Justice (Local
and Global),” it is better to think of these sorts of “ecological debts” as
incursive, or if you like imperial, rather than purely extractive: “In [the
case of carbon emissions], Europeans act as if we owned a sizable
chunk of the planet outside Europe; . . . the occupation of an
environmental space larger than one’s own territory gives rise to an
ecological debt with spatial and temporal dimensions.”9 Now, to be
sure, there are myriad cases of extractive ecological debt; one thinks,
for instance, of the tiny island nation of Nauru in the South Pacific,
whose interior was almost completely strip-mined for phosphates for
use as agricultural fertilizer over the course of the twentieth century
and now looks more or less like the surface of the moon, and is just as
dead. This once self-sustaining island paradise, a place formerly known
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as “Pleasant Island,” now subsists on the importation of necessities
paid for through a rapidly depleting trust established during the years
of the phosphorus boom, international money laundering, sales of
passports to noncitizens with few questions asked, and sporadic
foreign aid.10
So there is certainly extractive debt—but the more general form of
ecological debt is not extractive but incursive. Ecological debt arises
when the “unpaid costs” of capitalism in the developed nations are
borne by inhabitants of the underdeveloped ones. In this sense the
notion of an outsized global footprint is closely related to postcolonial
studies of empire. The concept of ecological debt first arose out of
Latin American political thought in the 1990s as a kind of special case
of postcolonial reparations. Writing in 1994, José María Borrero Navia,
one of the early popularizers of the concept, noted that ecological debt
is not some abstract obligation to the biosphere as such but an
obligation to “humanity, acquired by reason of often irreversible
damages to the biophysical base of societies provoked by the islands
of privilege, wasteful economics and industries of barbarity, the
consequences of which have been the impoverishment and exclusion
of hundreds of millions of people, ethnocide, and subjugation of
cultures.”11 Ecological debt is owed not to the planet but to other
persons: persons who were not volitional participants in this exchange
in the first place, who never signed any sort of contract but whom we
must conclude are owed a moral and legal debt for what has been
done without their consent to the places where they live.

”Our Future Is Not for Sale”: Climate Debt
Another arresting example of the imperial, extraspatial debt
incurred by the negative consequences cascading out of agricultural
production is found in the forty-thousand-square-kilometer “dead
zone” in the Black Sea brought about by fertilizer overuse in the
communist bloc over three decades, starting in the 1960s. The region
has begun a long and slow recovery since the fall of the Soviet Union
in 1991, but this recovery is now threatened by the entry of the
Danube basin into the European Union, whose Western European
industrial agriculturalists are looking to buy cheap farmland and begin
the cycle of fertilizer overuse and soil/water degradation all over
again.12 We might think as well of the recent Deepwater Horizon crisis
in the Gulf of Mexico, where a massive spill in an offshore oil rig owned
by British Petroleum reached proportions that far exceed the Exxon
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Valdez and will affect the ecology of the entire region negatively for
years to come.
But the most strikingly exemplary case for this more abstract
mode of “imperial” ecological debt might be the archipelago nation of
Tuvalu, population twelve thousand, whose remoteness and lack of
extractable natural resources have led to a largely bloodless colonial
relationship with the imperial powers of Europe and North America.
Tuvalu rose to prominence during the climate negotiations in
Copenhagen in 2009 because it will be one of the first nations to face
the devastating consequences of climate change. For a nation whose
highest point is merely 4.5 meters above sea level, the effects of rising
waters will be immediate and catastrophic. The existential threat to
Tuvalu has lent it moral weight as the leader of the group of
developing nations demanding immediate sweeping action, including a
legally binding accord that would stabilize carbon at 350 ppm. These
nations insist on measures that would limit the rise in global
temperatures rise to 1.5 °C, demand wide-ranging financial payments
from developed nations, and oppose carbon exceptions for
fastergrowing developing nations like India, China, and Brazil.13 Ian
Fry, Tuvalu’s delegate at Copenhagen, told those gathered that for
these nations, the “future rests on the outcome of this meeting.” When
the meeting ended with none of its demands having been met, Fry
concluded, “It looks like we are being offered 30 pieces of silver to
betray our people and our future. . . . Our future is not for sale. I
regret to inform you that Tuvalu cannot accept this document.”14
Unfortunately, Tuvalu may not have a future at all. According to
James Lewis’s paper “Sea-Level Rise: Some Implications for Tuvalu,”
published in 1989 by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, a 20 to
40 cm rise in sea level by the end of the century will leave much of
Tuvalu flooded, and much or all of the population will likely need to be
evacuated.15 The early date of this paper should serve as a reminder
that the climate change crisis has been widely recognized for over two
decades, which have since passed without any significant action on the
part of the industrialized states that produce most of the world’s
greenhouse gases. Moreover, if these estimates of sea level rise are
found to be too conservative, naturally the situation will only be worse.
Tuvalu’s relationship to global ecological crisis exemplifies “ecological
debt” in its most immediate and urgent form: the relationship of a
southern people facing deprivation, displacement, or outright
elimination of their way of life as a consequence of the actions of the
industrialized North. In what Naomi Klein has memorably called a
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“cruel geographical irony,” the chief economist at the World Bank has
estimated that “about 75 to 80 percent” of the damage caused by
climate change “will be suffered by developing countries, although
they only contribute about one-third of greenhouse gases”— and even
that “one-third” suggests a presentist perspective that obliterates all
but the most recent history of emissions.16 The true number is closer
to 20 percent of the population of the planet having emitted 75
percent of the total historical greenhouse gas emission, with the
United States (5 percent global population) emitting approximately 25
percent just on its own.17 Haiti, in contrast, emits just 1 percent of
total global carbon emissions, but according to the Maplecroft Climate
Change Vulnerability Index it is the world’s second-most endangered
nation because of climate change, behind only Somalia.18
In contrast to the usual political assertions of climate
emergency—that we are “one planet” on a “pale blue dot,” all in this
together, facing a shared crisis that threatens us all universally—
climate debt stakes its claim by insisting on particularity and
difference.19 Climate change, the argument goes, is not at all some
“natural disaster”; it is not something that “just happened” like an
asteroid from space; it is something the Global North has inflicted on
everybody else, with the worst consequences having ramifications on
those nations in the Global South that did not contribute to the crisis
and that are worst positioned to adapt. Klein highlights the work of
Bolivia’s chief climate negotiator, Angelica Navarro, who has said,
“Millions of people—in small islands, least-developed countries,
landlocked countries as well as vulnerable communities in Brazil, India
and China, and all around the world—are suffering from the effects of
a problem to which they did not contribute.” In Bolivia itself, the two
largest cities face severe water shortages as a result of nearby glaciers
melting from rising temperatures.20
As a policy measure, Klein writes, ecological debt (her version focuses
specifically on climate debt because it can be so easily quantified)
demands three basic categories of behavior:
1.) Developed nations must recognize that they have a legal
obligation to pay the costs for nations in the Global South to
ameliorate the effects of climate change. In US legal parlance, this is
the simple principle that the “polluter pays.” That these are
reparations, and not charity, additional loans, or neoliberal strategies
for so-called “development” that will only worsen the problem, is
key.21 Klein quotes two activists who speak to the pressing need for a
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recognition of climate debt. “Climate debt is not a matter of charity,”
says Lidy Nacpil, a coordinator for Jubilee South. “What we need is not
something we should be begging for but something that is owed to us,
because we are dealing with a crisis not of our making.” An advocate
for Maasai tribespeople in Kenya, Sharon Looremeta, gives a more
stark appraisal: “The Maasai community does not drive 4x4s or fly off
on holidays in airplanes. . . . We have not caused climate change, yet
we are the ones suffering. This is an injustice and should be stopped
right now.”22
2). Developed nations must pay the cost to “leapfrog” developing
nations past the dirty carbon stage of modernization towards cleaner,
more sustainable technologies. The developing world cannot be
expected to sacrifice its chances at industrial development because the
United States and Europe have already used up the planet’s entire
carbon capacity for themselves. “We cannot and will not give up our
rightful claim to a fair share of atmospheric space on the promise that,
at some future stage, technology will be provided to us,” Navarro has
said.23
3) To the extent that carbon emissions remain necessary for
development, developed nations must bear the vast majority of carbon
emissions cuts, bringing their carbon emissions below even the
percentage of the planetary population they represent in order to
“make atmospheric space available” for the undeveloped and
developing nations that have not yet used their allotment, and for
whom emissions mean things like rural electrification rather than
surplus bourgeois comforts.24
The United States’ head climate negotiator, Todd Stern, has
rejected any call for reparations as “wildly unrealistic” and “untethered
to reality,”;25 he dismissively told a news conference: “I actually
completely reject the notion of a debt or reparations or anything of the
like. . . . For most of the 200 years since the Industrial Revolution,
people were blissfully ignorant of the fact that emissions caused a
greenhouse effect. It’s a relatively recent phenomenon.”26 But when
Stern was senior US negotiator at the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in
1997, nearly ten years had already passed after NASA’s James Hansen
testified to Congress in 1988 about the imminent dangers posed by
global climate change. Hansen’s findings were the result of wide
scientific consensus about global warming in the mid-1970s, which
were based on climate models about global warming developed in the
1950s, over half a century after the concept was first proposed by
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Svante Arrhenius in 1896. However one chooses to narrate that
history, to suggest that the North has somehow been blindsided by all
this sudden interest in carbon and the climate is baldly disingenuous.

Suing the Present: Climate Trials
The question of precisely who the debtors and who the creditors
are when it comes to climate debt is a fraught one. José María Borrerro
Navia points to four categories of debtors:
1.
Transnational corporations, whose power lies in creating a
system of subjugation.
2.
Transnational banks that play an unquestionable role in the
promotion of ecological disasters in the name of development.
3.
Northern governmental bureaucracies, self-affirmed as the
hegemonic power, especially since the collapse of Eastern socialist
bureaucracies.
4.
Southern bureaucrats and elites who have engineered, directly
or indirectly, ecological destruction processes in their countries.27
Left off the hook? Those everyday consumers in the industrialized
countries fingered by Kenya’s Sharon Looremeta, who “drive 4x4s or
fly off on holidays in airplanes.” But perhaps this is not so obscene as
it might first appear. John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark have argued
that the ecologically destructive patterns of consumption on the part of
everyday westerners should be thought of as a kind of cognitive
“consumer trap.” These consumers, they maintains, are constrained
by choices that have already been made at the level of production by
the transnational corporate elite. Thus, any personal consumer
“choice” is already determined by a system marked by deterioration
and waste, a framework on which the individual consumer has
essentially no leverage. He or she moreover will often lack the
knowledge necessary to make a truly informed choice in the first
place.28 It was Marx himself, after all, who argued in the first chapter
of the first volume of Capital that we can know the true workings of
the system only by working at the level of production, not
consumption.
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And even those self-same corporate overloads are in some sense
“blameless” in the sense that it is the system itself—the production
treadmill of capitalism—that inevitably accelerates environmental
damage and degeneration. We should not be surprised that so little
has been done. What drives the “thoroughgoing deterioration of the
Earth and of the nature” is the logic of capitalism itself, a mode of
production that both insists (culturally) and depends (structurally) on
limitless expansion and permanent growth: into new markets, into the
former colonial periphery, into the peasant countryside, through oil
derricks into the deepest crevices of the earth, through carbon
emissions and ozone degradation into the upper atmosphere, and
finally via rocket to Earth orbit—and, then, in its most cherished
futurological imaginings, to orbital space stations, lunar cities, Martian
settlements, asteroid belt mining colonies, sleeper ships to Alpha
Centauri, and on and on. It is capitalism itself that is subject to the
two-century-old Jevons paradox, the sociological law which
demonstrates that improvements in energy efficiency do not
correspond with reductions in consumption; innovations that consume
half the fuel will simply be used twice as much.29 “Capitalism,” Foster
writes in his ecological history of capitalism, The Vulnerable Planet,
“cannot exist without constantly expanding the realm of production:
Any interruption in this process will take the form of economic crisis.”30
This is why the market solutions proposed by Lord Nicholas
Stern in the Stern Report are rightly rejected by Vandana Shiva in Soil,
Not Oil as mere eco-imperialism that “allows corporations to gain
increasing control of the earth’s resources—energy, water, air, land,
and biodiversity—to continue to run the industrialized globalized
economy.”31 She highlights the absurdity of a pollution reduction
strategy in which “carbon credits” are given to historical polluters to
financialize as profit: “Nonpolluting, nonindustrial activity does not
even figure in Kyoto’s CDM [Clean Development Mechanisms]. To be
counted as clean, you must first be dirty.”32
Neoliberal market solutions are especially perverse as they arise in the
precise moment that multiple ecological crises inescapably
demonstrate the impossibility of market stewardship of the
environment. Market logics such as cap and trade will always reduce to
the logic of Larry Summers’s infamous memo to senior World Bank
staff arguing that “the World Bank should be encouraging more
migration of the dirty industries to the LDC [Less Developed
Countries]” on the grounds that the lowest-wage earning nations will
necessary have the lowest costs associated with the illness and death
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of pollution their mortality rate is already high anyway such countries
are “vastly under-polluted” compared to, say, Mexico City and Los
Angeles, with their elevated smog levels.33
Summers has since claimed the memo was satire, but whatever
the intended tone, the memo reflects a certain truth about the slippery
operation of “efficiency” as it operates with regard to environmental
economics. As Brazil’s former secretary of the environment José
Lutzenburger fired back: “Your reasoning is perfectly logical but totally
insane. . . . Your thoughts [provide] a concrete example of the
unbelievable alienation, reductionist thinking, social ruthlessness and
the arrogant ignorance of many conventional ‘economists’ concerning
the nature of the world we live in.”34
Blissful inaction and deliberate malfeasance on the part of elites
in the developed world has been so stark, in fact, that for some,
including James Hansen, the operative term is not climate debt so
much as climate trials. Hansen, who was arrested at a mountaintop
removal coal protest against the now- infamous Massey Energy
Corporation in 2009, the same firm whose Upper Big Branch coal mine
collapsed in West Virginia in early 2010 after receiving thousands of
dollars in fines from mine safety citations, has called for CEOs of major
energy corporations to be tried for “crimes against humanity.”35
Others, like Jamais Cascio, founder of worldchanging.org, have
speculated on the near-future “tobaccoification” of carbon, in reference
to industry-funded denialism in the face of established scientific
consensus.36 Still others would name the Bush, Blair, and Harper
administrations, for starters, as codefendants.
Science fiction writer Bruce Sterling, while generally skeptical of
the potential for climate trials to put us on the road to a more rational
climate policy, does not doubt their symbolic value. He memorably
wrote in one of his annual “State of the World” reports that “polluting
the entire sky is the biggest market failure in the history of the human
race, when the Hamptons and Malibu start goingunder water, really
rich and powerful people are gonna get mad and vengeful.”37 The
recognition of the moral demand made by ecological debt provides a
framework to harness the righteous anger of the rich and the poor
alike, providing strategies for resistance to business as usual: forging
political alliances, mass protest movements, divestment campaigns,
civil disobedience, and other strategies for social mobilization. Naomi
Klein highlights the way indigenous groups in Canada have attempted
to leverage the nation’s unpaid obligations to First Nation peoples
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against its WTO status and its Standard & Poor bond rating, essentially
arguing that Canada keeps vast “unfunded liabilities” off its books. The
same judolike reversal of market logic might be made against
transnational corporations and industrialized nations of the Global
North alike. In 2008, in an astonishing act of jury nullification in the
United Kingdom, six anticoal activists were cleared of criminal liability
of thirty-five thousand euros of damage on the grounds that they had
a “lawful excuse” to prevent the coal plant’s functioning in order to
prevent damage to the environment.38 That same year, a stunt
classaction lawsuit was filed by an activist in the International Criminal
Court asking for “$1 billion dollars in damages on behalf of future
generations of human beings on Earth—if there are any.”39

The Future in the Present: Permaculture
Of course some number of human beings will likely survive even the
worst projections of ecological catastrophe—but if we continue to let
capitalism blithely take its course, those who do survive will live lives
dramatically worse than the ones they might otherwise have, had we
acted. Alongside the obligation to already existing humans is the
obligation to the ones who will exist, whose inheritance we are
squandering—which is an obligation to humanity as such. Without
disputing the urgency of climate debt’s call to defend both bio- and
cultural diversity in the here and now, at the same time we must
recognize, dialectically, the urgency of its call to a shared futurity; the
recognition of ecological debt compels us to recognize a planetary
commons extending in both space and time, from which global
capitalism has ceaselessly appropriated more than its fair share. In
his contribution to Red Planets: Marxism and Science Fiction, cultural
critic Carl Freedman identifies a central disjuncture in Marxist thought
between the deflationary and inflationary modes of critique. “The
deflationary dimension,” he writes, “is represented by the attempt to
destroy all illusions necessary or useful to the preservation of class
society in general and of capitalism in particular” —this can be seen
fairly clearly in ideology critique but also in the more specifically
structural discussion of the “secret” of surplus-value in Capital.40 This,
Freedman suggests, has a certain figurative relationship with noir in
prose and film.41 While noir does not produce usable knowledge about
the workings of capital, the genre’s preoccupation with individual
greed “allegorically gestures towards . . . the kind of knowledge
discoverable through application of Marx’s principle of the ultimately
determining role of the economy.”42 It produces a kind of affective
intuition that points us in the right direction, so to speak, if not getting
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us much of the way there Deflation is an economic mode, a scientific
mode, and something of a cold mode—it is the mode that drives
Marx’s many formulae. Inflation, in contrast, is much more
fragmentary and affective than deflation. It is effusive and intangible,
a mode of prophecy and dreams. Marx, after all, had famously little to
say about what the world would be like under communism, but the
utopian impulse towards a liberatory fulfillment of history—Marx calls it
history’s true beginning, Engels called it “humanity’s leap from the
kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom”—is nonetheless
always the beating heart at the center of the Marxist project.43 For
Freedman, the genre most closely associated with this utopian impulse
is science fiction, and he goes on to argue that, unlike noir, science
fiction narratives can provide better pictures of the inflationary future
than straight expository prose; because it is impossible to produce
concrete knowledge of the future in the same way we can produce it of
the present and the past, it is science fiction—itself a dialectic between
deflationary scientific cognition and unbound inflationary
estrangement—that produces our best cognitive maps of potential
futures.44
Of course inflation and deflation function as a dialectic—we find echoes
of each in the other. The cold calculus of deflation is predicated on a
baseline moral recognition that the injustices that are being described
should not exist; and the soaring heights of inflation can only surpass
mere wishful thinking when they arise out of a scientific understanding
of capitalist reality as it now does.
Ecocritique, like science fiction, and like the Marxist project as a
whole, necessarily operates requires both deflation and inflation to
stay vital, which is why the impulse towards the deflationary naming of
various ecological catastrophes, in which terrifying scenarios draw
attention to the consequences of inaction, must be matched by an
inflationary, futurological impulse towards a better world for all of us—
a transformative futurology that will always be, in some way or
another, a science fiction. In that vein I want to conclude with the
concept science fiction writer Kim Stanley Robinson has borrowed from
Australian agriculturists Bill Mollison and David Holmgren and put to
work in his novels: permaculture, which describes self-renewing
agricultural practices that (unlike the ones Justus von Liebig both
studied and developed) can be sustained indefinitely.
In an interview with the website BLDBLOG, Robinson points out that
permaculture “suggests a certain kind of obvious human goal, which is
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that future generations will have at least as good a place to live as
what we have now.”45 In that same interview he suggests
permaculture as an alternative twenty first century name for utopia.
But this principle does not mean that permaculture must be defined by
the penury of too-limited resources. Permaculture rejects the
neoMalthusian logic of resource scarcity and the oxymoronic paradigm
of “sustainable growth” in favor of what it is essentially raw futurity, a
politico-ethical imperative not only that there should be a future but
that the people in it deserve a decent world in which to live.
And the same, of course, must be said for the people of the present:
they, too, deserve a decent world in which to live. In some sense it
may seem perverse to worry about the future for hypothetical persons
when there are billions for whom this promise has already been
broken. But we need to do both; deflation without inflation is just dead
numbers, rage without hope. Only a sense that human civilization has
a future can motivate us to make that future real. The science-fictional
narratives of writers like Robinson are, in my view, vital in helping us
to imagine an ecologically engaged politics, even a science-fictional
politics. In his first novel, The Wild Shore (1984), he imagines an
America that has been bombed back to the Stone Age, watched from
the coastline by a coalition of nations eager to prevent American
reunification; decades later, a character who lived through the event
explains the contradictions in his own memory of America, which is
incidentally our present: “America was huge, it was a giant. It swam
through the seas eating up all the littler countries—drinking them up
as it went along. We were eating up the world, boy, and that’s why the
world rose up and put an end to us. So I’m not contradicting myself.
America was great like a whale—it was giant and majestic, but it stank
and was a killer. Lots of fish died to make it so big. Now haven’t I
always taught you that?”46 In another early book, Pacific Edge,
Robinson advances what could be the sad maxim of human history:
“Every culture is as wasteful as it can afford to be.”47 The vision of
history that informs his novels foregrounds the destructive
contradictions at the heart of industrial society, as he notes in an
interview in Polygraph:
I’ve been trying to use standard economic terms to describe the
situation in ways capitalists might have to come to terms with and that
might serve as entry-points to a larger discussion: that the implicit
promise of capitalism was that a generation would work so hard in the
working class that its children would be in the middle class, and that if
extended this program would eventually lift everyone on Earth. But
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now resource analysis makes it clear that for the three billion living on
less than two dollars a day this promise can never be fulfilled, so that
capitalism is really nothing but a big Ponzi scheme, and would be
illegal if run in a single state or community.
Then also, the pricing we put on things, carbon especially, does
not include the environmental costs of making the thing, so that we
are practicing systemic predatory dumping, and the competitors we
are predating on are our own children and the generations to come. So
we are predatory dumpers, out- competing non-existent people, which
is easy enough, but they will suffer when they come into existence,
and we are cheaters.48
But Robinson is never as cynical as these quotes might imply: he has
spent his career in pursuit of utopia, even residing in a utopian
planned community in California. In his seminal Mars trilogy (1990s),
his characters move through all the usual utopian forms. The Martian
colonists reenact King utopus’s iconic act of closure—the digging of the
trench that separates Utopia from the mainland—in their destruction of
the Martian space elevator. They openly revolt against terrestrial
control; when open resistance fails, they engage in hit-and-fade
guerrilla tactics. They infiltrate. Some become terrorists. There is
even, as it were, a traditional sudden apocalypse—not one but two
Great Floods—acts of God from above and from without, which leave
both Earth and Mars in position to be politically transformed. These,
too, fail.
In the end there are only two sorts of revolutions that actually work in
the Mars trilogy. The first is the aeroforming of the settlers, Robinson’s
analogy to terraforming, which sees settlers transformed by Mars in
much the same way that they sought to transform it. It is the
displacement in space that returns, at the end of a century obsessed
with time, to provide the possibility for real human change— and it
occurs because the remove to Mars forces us, but also allows us, to
reconnect and re-embed ourselves in an ecology, to once again be part
of an ecologically rational cycle. (Robinson has elsewhere called for us
to imagine ourselves as terraforming Earth—noting that in fact we
already are, by wrecking
it.)49)
Tthe second utopian move is that other impossibility, that other thing
besides the future that we no longer quite believe in: collective action
in the present on behalf of the future, which is to say political agency.
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Robinson is a believer in coalition—in the building and nurturing of
activist networks. In the end it is the tough, almost parliamentary
work of reaching compromises, brokering deals, and changing minds
that allows the disastrous cycle of war and revolution to be finally
averted, the search for (and improbable discovery of) the missing color
that might unite Red and Green. At the end of Blue Mars the
revolutionary break is a televised speech from a group of
astronaut/scientists, which underscores how utopian a thinker Kim
Stanley Robinson really is. Robinson’s politics is an ongoing praxis that
achieves victories but is never victorious—in Pacific Edge (1988),
Robinson defines utopia not as final, fixed fulfillment but as a process:
“Struggle forever.”50 No one said it would be easy.
In Polygraph 22 Michael Hardt writes that during his trip to the
protests in Copenhagen he noticed that there’s been a significant shift
on the left since the seminal Seattle protests ten years ago. Then, the
slogan was “We want everything for everybody”—and you still see
some versions of that sign. But at Copenhagen the much more
common poster was a different slogan: “There is no Planet B.” The
first, Hardt writes, “sounds like an absurd, reckless notion that will
propel us further down the route of mutual destruction”; the other, he
says, sounds like Margaret Thatcher’s infamous proclamation that
“there is no alternative” to neoliberal capitalism.51 The slogan of
Seattle is ambitious, inflationary, and fundamentally impossible; the
slogan of the ecological activists is deflationary, anti-ambitious, and
starkly realistic. I suggest that permaculture is the way to retain the
inflationary spirit of the first while embracing the deflationary
acknowledgment of our finitude in the second. Unlike capitalist
futurity, which is self-defeatingly dependent on infinite growth on a
finite planet, permaculture does not promise an impossible
supercsession of inevitable limits; it instead locates the promise of a
better future within those limits. Permaculture is a mode that looks to
ecological limit not as a state of emergency or as an impending
disaster but as a necessary constraint, as the rules of the game we
have all been playing all this time.
Hardt goes on: “Indeed the struggles against neoliberalism of the past
decades have been defined by their belief in the possibility of radical,
seemingly limitless alternatives. In short, the World Social Forum
motto, ‘Another world is possible,’ might translate in the context of the
climate changes movements into something like, ‘This world is still
possible, maybe.’”52 Invoking the concept of ecological debt—accepting
its relentless ethical demand that debts must be paid, that thefts must
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be made right, accepting debt and indebtedness as part of the circuits
of social interconnectedness and mutual dependence that make a
permaculture—helps us strike that “maybe.” As the philosopher of
liberation Enrique Dussel put it when he unknowingly echoed both
Hardt and Robinson in his Twenty Theses on Politics: “The critical
ecological principle of politics could be expressed as follows: We must
behave in all ways such that life on planet Earth might be a perpetual
life!”53 In this way the rational accounting of our environmental limits
and the long-delayed accounting of our ecological debts need not
speak to withdrawal, renunciation, or defeat; it does not speak to an
end to progress, of either the technological or the social sort, or of
cascading disasters too far gone to remedy. In fact, in an era of
climate change, ocean acidification, and Peak Everything, just to begin
to name the crises, the rational consideration of ecological limits is the
necessary prerequisite for any progress in our time—not in despair at
what is not possible, but in hope for what still is. In this sense when
we begin at last to talk about ecological debt we are speaking, in the
tradition of the best of Marxism, and the most utopian of our science
fictions, not of history’s end but of its true beginning.
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Dussel quickly admits, the relentless march of entropy means life
on earth can never really be perpetual—but, he quickly adds, that
doesn’t mean we shouldn’t do our best.
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